This paper models the impacts of market size and team competition for fan base on matchday attendance in the English Premier League over the period 1997-2004 using a large panel data set. We construct a comprehensive set of control variables and use tobit estimation to overcome the problems caused by sell-out crowds. We also account for unobserved influences on attendance by means of random effects attached to home teams. Our treatment of market size, with its use of Geographical Information System techniques, is more sophisticated than in previous attendance demand studies.
Introduction
In professional team sports leagues around the world, market size is a fundamental determinant of league outcomes, as measured by league standings or probability of winning trophies. This proposition is valid for North American leagues, where teams (franchises) are typically viewed as trying to maximise profits (Fort and Quirk, 1995) . It is also valid for European football leagues, even if clubs try to maximise an alternative objective such as number of games won (Késenne, 1999) .
Large disparities in market size sometimes induce league authorities to introduce cross-subsidisation schemes to transfer resources to smaller clubs. An example of this can be found in Major League Baseball where a luxury tax is levied on the largest teams, such as the New York Yankees, with the proceeds redistributed to smaller teams such as the Kansas City Royals.
At club level, the size of the market generates resources which can be used for investment in playing talent. Also, players will tend to gravitate towards teams where the extra revenues from their contributions to the team are highest and hence their salaries are highest (Burger and Walters, 2003) . Again, this migration of talent will occur whether teams maximise profits or games won (Kesenne, 1999) .
A crucial difference between North American and European sports leagues is that North American franchises tend to be allocated centrally by the league and tend to be widely dispersed geographically. This quite deliberate policy is designed to protect club revenues from competition by ensuring monopoly status for teams in their local markets (see Leeds and von Allmen, 2005, 190-192 for details) . In North America, leagues are closed (without promotion or relegation) and each league is essentially a franchise monopolist working to maximise members' monopoly profits. There are two direct consequences of this. First, franchises can and do migrate. In the National Hockey League there has been a steady drift of Canadian franchises to larger markets in the United States over the last two decades (Cocco and Jones, 1997) . Second, it is rare to find more than one team competing with another in the same metropolitan area. Indeed, some large metropolitan centres may be without a major league team in a particular sport (for example, Los Angeles in American Football).
In European football, restriction on entry to the top tier of a league is primarily by promotion and in principle any team can aspire to top tier status. Some leagues do impose conditions on stadium suitability but generally entry and exit in the top divisions is fluid. Also, it is common to find several teams in major cities competing at the top level. For example, London had six teams in the English Premier League in 2005/6 out of a total of 20.
Hence, market size is a key concept in the literature on economics of professional team sports, whether the focus is primarily North American or European. One important channel by which market size generates resources for sports teams is though gate attendance. In this paper, we examine how and to what extent market size determines matchday attendance in the English Premier League. We take explicit account of two potential influences. First, we assess the role of local population size in determining matchday attendances. Second, we examine the role of competition between clubs. Other things equal, including size of local population, we predict that the greater the number of competing clubs in a specific area, the lower will be matchday attendance. Our key concepts are market size and competition between clubs and each is to be calibrated using Geographical Information System (GIS) techniques applied to data from the England and Wales Census of Population 2001.
Such techniques have received little prior attention in the sports management and economics literatures.
The paper is constructed as follows. In section 1 we establish our attendance demand model. Section 2 develops our measures of market size and competition between clubs. Section 3 deals with estimation issues and presents our data. Section 4 offers our empirical results while section 5 concludes.
An attendance demand model
Economists' consumer theory typically generates a demand function for a product in which quantity demanded is a function of own price, price of related goods, income and tastes. 1 Inclusion of ticket price in a model of sports matchday attendance creates problems as price data are difficult to obtain and clubs usually have an array of prices for different groups of spectators and different types of seating accommodation. Consequently, it is common practice for researchers to let club intercept terms, or fixed effects, capture unobserved ticket prices. This is the approach followed here. 2 Moreover, the literature on matchday attendance in team sports tends 1 The notion of substitution between goods induced by relative price variations does not fit comfortably into sports fan behaviour. Fans are unlikely to switch allegiance between teams because one team offers lower ticket prices than another. However, they may be less inclined to attend when prices are perceived as too high and/or alternative activities appear more attractive. 2 A common problem in many studies of matchday attendance is that price elasticity of demand is often estimated to be substantially below unity. A revenue-maximising team would set ticket prices where to emphasise sport-specific characteristics, comprising attributes of the teams involved in particular matches and we follow this direction (see Borland and Macdonald, 2003 , for a comprehensive review of studies of attendance demand in various sports). 
Variables identified by jk subscripts are identified separately for home and away teams. The characteristics of away teams will be important for matchday attendance for two broad reasons. First, the attractiveness of the away team will influence how many home fans turn up to the game. Second, fans of the away team will travel to the game and the number of these who appear will depend on away team characteristics.
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Under the heading of team support, we first include the log of average home team gate from the previous season for home and away teams: log average home attendance last and log average away attendance last. The former variable is intended to capture the substantial habit persistence of home fans. A hard core of supporters price elasticity is unity. Empirical studies that use ticket price as an explanatory variable run into the problem that price variation may be correlated with changes in tastes. Forrest, Simmons and Feehan (2002) argue that price elasticities have been understated in the sports economics literature and propose a generalised measure of fan costs of attendance which includes travel costs. Applying this measure to cross-section fan survey data for 1995/6, they find that price elasticity rises to close to unity for several English Premier League clubs. 3 Interestingly clubs that experience excess demand by home fans still allocate a proportion of seats to away firms. This is partly to encourage reciprocal behaviour by rival teams but also to encourage a lively atmosphere within the stadium.
will turn out to follow their team whatever its fortunes. (Borland and Macdonald, 2003; Szymanski, 2003) . It is not at all obvious that closeness of contest should affect matchday attendance when the crowd is overwhelmingly partisan and is primarily concerned with a victory for a team of its allegiance.
Some Premier League games were broadcast live over our sample period by the satellite provider Sky Sports. Other things equal, broadcast matches should lower matchday attendance as some fans swap the comfort (and lower cost) of viewing at home or in a pub for attendance at the ground. Indeed, Sky recognises the potential loss in gate revenues for clubs whose games are broadcast live by offering a substantial 'facility fee' which more than compensates the clubs for loss of gate revenues (Forrest, Simmons and Szymanski, 2004) . Here, we establish a set of from non-European Union countries. Overall, we expect that a player's salary will be a good reflection of his expected contribution to team performance and revenues. Our set of control variables also includes month and year dummy variables and a dummy variable for games played on public holidays (bank holiday).
Although interesting in their own right, all variables constructed thus far are merely control variables and are secondary to our main concerns which are the effects of market size and team competition on gate attendance. In the next section, we show how GIS methods are used to generate measures of market size and team competition for fans. Population data are available at various levels for England and Wales, including county, local authority and ward. We construct our market size measure by first using the smallest level, the output area. This gives a very detailed picture of population as the average number of people within an output area is 297 with a standard deviation of 71. We then count the number of individuals within output areas that lie within specified distances from each team's stadium. Concentric rings are derived using the GIS programme, Mapinfo. These rings increase by five mile radii up to a maximum of 30 miles. Market size is then the log of population within a particular ring zone and we experiment with radial distances in the empirical specification. A clue as to what can be expected is to be found in Forrest, Simmons and Feehan (2002) . Using fan survey data and the same method of constructing concentric rings around stadia (with 1991 census of population data) they found that the relationship between attendance and distance travelled by supporters was best fitted using a gravity model, sharp reduction in support as distance travelled increased. The majority of home fans lived within 10 miles of the stadium. The use of five mile intervals for the width of concentric rings preserves homogeneity of travel costs within each zone. In our case, we lack precise travel cost information for fans so it is important that the assumption of homogeneous costs can be sustained. Everton to the west. This is likely to be a more difficult obstacle to overcome than the local peculiarity that, until recently, the town's Rugby League team enjoyed greater attendances than the football team.
Measuring market size and competition for fans
As noted above, the multiplicity of football teams in metropolitan areas stands in sharp contrast to the territorial restrictions imposed in North American major league sports. The level of competition between clubs is likely to be negatively related to the amount of playing talent that can be hired. Indeed, this is an important reason why the North American teams invoke their particular restrictions. Here, we hypothesise that increased competition between teams will reduce gate attendance, given market size and our various control variables.
To measure competition, we could simply count the number of other Premier and
Football League teams within a specified distance, say 20 miles. Although this would be useful we prefer to exploit information from the census of population more precisely. Using Mapinfo, we construct 10 mile radial rings around each club.
Suppose there are two clubs located within 10 miles of the focus club's ground. The proportion of all people residing within a club's 10 mile radial ring and within a 10 mile radial ring of the other club is taken as our measure of competition. Figure 1 shows an example of overlapping rings for two clubs in our sample, Newcastle and Sunderland.
Where there is more than one neighbouring club, we have more than one intersection of overlapping rings. In this case, the proportions of overlapping population are aggregated and the value of competition may exceed unity. In fact, the value of competition ranges from zero to 7.88 with a mean of 1.90 and standard deviation of 2.37. The highest value occurs for Arsenal, revealing the intensity of competition for fans in the Inner London area. Tottenham Hotspur, located close to Arsenal, have the next lowest value at 7.76.
Our measures of market size and competition are entered into our model separately for home and away teams in a particular fixture. This is consistent with our treatment of our fan support variables. We offer a treatment of market size that is not restricted to arbitrary local authority boundaries. 7 Moreover our measure of team competition overcomes the ad hoc treatment of dividing metropolitan population by number of teams as a measure of market size per team that has occurred in some previous studies (e.g. Burger and Walters, 2003) . The use of GIS methods allows us to model market size and competition jointly as explanatory variables in our attendance demand model.
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Data and empirical estimation
We need to address the problem that several Premier League clubs regularly sell tickets at levels close to ground capacity. This is an awkward problem that must be confronted in our empirical estimation. For a high proportion of games in our sample, we find that reported attendances are close to stadium capacity. Police segregation policies mean that clubs rarely report attendances exactly at capacity levels. We define 'at capacity' to mean attendance levels at more than 95% of stated ground capacity. On this basis, the proportion of censored games in our sample was 54.6%. Attendance at capacity cannot vary, for the team in question, by construction and Ordinary Least Squares estimates will be biased. As an alternative we use Tobit estimation.
In our model, stadium capacity is the censoring point and our attendance data are right-censored (see Figure 2) . Only the data to the left of the censoring point can be used for estimation and so we have a truncated normal distribution for our dependent variable. The statistical distribution that is relevant for our attendance data is a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions representing the probability of a sellout crowd and the attendances for games that are not sold out.
Following Greene (2003) we can analyse this mixed distribution by defining a random variable, A, which is derived from 'true' demand, D, as 8 :
Suppose that true demand is normally distributed with mean µ and constant variance σ 2 . Let D = xβ + ε where ε is a random error term. Then the first component of the tobit model is the probability of a sell-out crowd which is given by:
The second component of the tobit model is the distribution of A given that it is below capacity. This is a truncated normal distribution with expectation E{A|A < C} = xβ + conditional expectation of a mean-zero normal variable, given that it is less than xβ -C. We now see why it would be inappropriate to restrict attention to games that do not sell out. The conditional expectation of A is not equal to xβ as it depends on x in a nonlinear relationship.
There are two extensions that can be readily made to fit our purpose. First, the censoring values can be made to vary across clubs as these have different stadium capacities. Secondly, we can estimate a random effects tobit model. This specifies true demand for game i hosted by team j at time t as
The random effects model specifies a set of team-specific constant terms that are randomly distributed across teams. We are assuming here that the team-specific effects are strictly uncorrelated with the regressors.
The coefficients generated by the random effects tobit model cannot be interpreted as impacts as would be the case in a linear regression model. Suppose we obtain a coefficient of β 1 on a variable x 1 . Then we can obtain the marginal effect on the expected value of A of a change in x 1 as
This gives the marginal effect of a change in x 1 upon the expected attendance A as the estimated coefficient multiplied by the probability of the game not being sold out. If this probability is one for a particular game then the marginal effect reduces to β 1 as in the linear model. Below, we report marginal effects rather than coefficients from our tobit estimates. Liverpool, Manchester City, Southampton) to contemplate moving to larger stadia to release existing capacity constraints.
Empirical results
Results from our random effects tobit estimation are shown in Table 2 . We should first note the absence of outcome uncertainty. This was included initially and as the coefficient was found to be not significantly different from zero we dropped this variable from the final results. Failure to find any significant role for outcome uncertainty is not a new finding in the sports economics literature. For example, Baimbridge et al. (1996) found no significant effect of a measure of outcome uncertainty based on absolute differences in league rankings in their study of Premier League football in the 1993/94 season (although they did not use tobit estimation).
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Our reported t-statistics will be understated, inference will be undermined and our estimates will be inefficient if the error term does not have constant variance. To test for unequal variance in the error term (heteroskedasticity) we apply the GoldfieldQuandt test (Greene, 2003) . Our dataset is partioned into three based on the magnitude of the following variables: home team's prior season attendance, home team's relative wage and current performance of the home team. The variances of the error terms from regression models of the partitions were tested for equality. The
Goldfield-Quandt test did not reject equality of variance of the error term.
Control variables
From our set of team support variables, it appears that habit persistence is strong within the Premier League since home team attendance is positively related to average attendance last season for both home and away teams. This applies to both incumbent and promoted teams. Tradition and reputation as proxied by home team league membership appear to be significant determinants of attendance. However, away team league membership does not have a significant effect on attendance. Distance affects matchday attendance in a non-linear fashion as found in other studies (Forrest, 9 See Borland and Macdonald (2003) for some studies on other sports which find a similar result. Simmons and Szymanski, 2004) . Derby matches involving keen local rivalry raise attendances, other things equal, by 6.0 per cent.
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In our set of team quality measures, home team and away team wage bill have significant coefficients of almost equal magnitude, suggesting that fans react to total quality of teams in a match when deciding to attend. We see that improved quality of We find that home team performance, as measured by points per game to date of match, has a positive and significant (at 1 per cent) effect on attendance. This is in line with prior expectations. But away team performance does not have a significant effect on attendance. Away team attributes that impact on gates are to be found elsewhere in the relative wage bill and distance variables.
The set of broadcasting variables gives clear evidence that live telecasts of Premier league games does reduce attendance, with the exception of games televised on public holidays. We find that live broadcasting on Sundays, the most popular slot for viewers, reduces gate attendance by 7.6 per cent, other things equal 11 . Taking account of the general loss in attendance for weekday games (4.7 per cent) we find that games broadcast on Monday nights are associated with 6.3 per cent lower attendance, ceteris paribus.
Market size and competition
Our results reveal a positive impact of market size on gate attendance, as expected.
After experimentation with sizes of concentric rings, we find that the population located in rings outside a 10 radius from the home team stadium does not contribute significantly to attendance. 12 Our key result, then, is that a 100 per cent increase in population within 10 miles of a ground raises gate attendance by 11.5 per cent. Put another way, consider two teams that are otherwise identical as specified by control variables. Then if one team has a population within 10 miles that is 100,000 greater than the other team, the team with larger population density is predicted to have 0.79 per cent greater attendance. At mean attendance, we estimate that this converts to £151,000 extra revenue per season.
We also find that away teams with greater population density near their grounds generate additional attendance. A 100 per cent larger away team population is associated with a 2.8 per cent greater attendance. 13 Alternatively a difference in away team population of 100,000 translates into an increase in attendance of 0.32 per cent.
11 Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo (2005) report results from a probit model of selection of Premier League games by Sky. In the second half of a season Sky has unrestricted choice of which games to broadcast and does tend to focus on matches involving teams higher up the League table. 12 The use of a 10 mile radius is consistent with Forrest, Simmons and Feehan (2002) who found that the majority of home fans travelled within this distance. Travel costs are reasonably homogeneous within this zone. 13 We lack data on numbers of away fans inside home stadia and so we cannot distinguish between the impacts of away team market on numbers of fans who travel and on attractiveness of larger away teams to home supporters. north London and their move should have no effect on gate attendance, other things equal.
Conclusion
We have modelled Premier League matchday attendances over the period 1997-2004 using a large panel data set. We have constructed a suitable set of control variables and have overcome the problems caused by sell-out crowds by use of tobit estimation. We have also accounted for unobserved influences on attendance by means of random effects attached to home teams. Our treatment of market size, with its use of GIS techniques, is more sophisticated than in previous attendance demand studies and would merit application in studies of other sports leagues.
Our main result is that, subject to other controlling influences, teams located in bigger markets are able to generate higher gate attendances than those in smaller markets.
Competition between clubs for the fan base in particular region is a partially offsetting influence. Our results support the fundamental proposition of various sports economists (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Késenne, 1999 ) that disparities in team performance ultimately reflect differences in playing talent that are in turn due to variations in market size. A companion paper, Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons (2005) , follows through and tests the implication of this argument. In the long-term, team performance is predicted to depend on market size. That proposition is also upheld in these authors' empirical work. Here, we have checked the first step in the process linking market size to team performance. Essentially, teams with larger market size have the potential to convert a greater fan base into greater gate, and other, revenues so as to generate resource to invest in player talent. Competition between teams for the fan base in a region plays a negative, offsetting role in the determination of gate attendance but does not totally eliminate the benefits of greater market size.
We offer two problems which we regard as worthy of further research. First, how is it that some large metropolitan areas have football teams with systematically weak performance? Birmingham, Bristol and Sheffield are possible areas to consider as these appear to have underperforming clubs. 15 Second, how do changes in population over time, through births, deaths and migration, impact upon disparities in market size between clubs. Our analysis has used 2001 census data. It would be interesting to compare our results from similar models constructed using the 1991 and earlier censuses to see how the dynamics of market size have impacted upon team attendances, revenues and performance Goddard, 1995, 2001) . A highly relevant research question is whether disparities in market size have increased for football teams over the two census periods. This would cast much light on the critical 15 In France, the absence of a successful club in Paris needs explanation.
policy question of the optimal degree of cross-subsidisation that the Premier League should offer to smaller teams. 
